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NOTE DE L’ÉDITEUR
Translated from the French original by Jonathan Hall
1 Swaran  Singh  is  currently  one  of  India’s  most  active  researchers  in  the  field  of
contemporary  Chinese  strategic  studies.  This  work  presents  an  overall  view of  the
political and strategic issues affecting the relations between China and its South-East
Asian neighbours. The first part, entitled Issues, identifies the main points of friction
which have arisen between China and these neighbours, around the questions of Tibet,
the Kashmir entanglement,  and the struggle for influence in the Indian Ocean. The
second part (Equations) reviews the bilateral links between China and each of the seven
countries of South-East Asia. The third part (Policies) sets out a systematic analysis of
China’s South-East Asian policies, and highlights their major directions over the last
fifty years.
2 The book sets out to show that relations between India and China are essentially a by-
product of the latter’s policies towards South-East Asia in general. At the same time,
however,  these  policies  turn  out  to  be  focused  mainly  on  India,  because  of  that
country’s preponderance within the regional sphere. From a historical point of view,
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security  concerns  have  played  the  leading  role  in  China’s  approach.  The  often
contested “liberation” of Tibet in 1950 rapidly poisoned relations with the countries on
China’s borders, primarily with India, against whom it finally mounted a “punitive”
expedition  on  the  Himalayan frontier  in  1962.  In  the  1960s  and  1970s,  against  the
background of the diplomatic freeze with New Delhi, China embarked on a policy of
active economic aid to the smaller South-East Asian nations, including a large number
of arms shipments, to counteract India’s influence in the region.
3 Subsequently, Singh’s book shows that strategic preoccupations gave way to a more
pragmatic approach, under the influence of the reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping.
The normalisation of relations with India in the 1980s led Peking to adopt a neutral
stance towards the Indo-Pakistani conflict in Kashmir, and to distance itself from the
other countries of South-East Asia. However, the author emphasises that this shift in
direction did not take place without certain contradictions, since the rapprochement
with India in no way put an end to the shipments of arms to Pakistan. According to the
author, this major contradiction, at least in the eyes of New Delhi, is what led directly
to the Indian nuclear tests in May 1998. He stresses a very important point with regard
to Sino-Pakistani relations, namely, that contrary to the expectations of the Chinese
government, the transfer of sensitive technology to Pakistan did not make the latter
completely dependent on Peking in the minds of the decision-makers in Islamabad.
They simply became more defiant towards India, while retaining their independence
with regard to China. This is borne out by the Pakistani nuclear tests in June 1998,
which were conducted in response to the Indian tests and in defiance of China’s calls
for restraint.
4 The big risk in undertaking such a large and complex task as the study of the relations
between China and South-East Asia, is that one can be enticed into “macro” analyses
and deploy  concepts  like  “South-East  Asia”,  or  even “China”,  as  though they  were
monolithic entities.  This book does not entirely avoid such pitfalls.  Perhaps a more
constructivist  analytical  method  would  have  thrown  greater  light  on  why  the
perceptions  of  India  by  the  Chinese  decision-makers—and  by  others—are  so
conditioned by a South-East Asian conceptual framework. But this work has the merit
of  raising an essential  question:  viz.  at  the  present  moment,  when India’s  strategic
ambitions are expanding to include the whole of Asia, is the Peking government ready
to redefine China’s relations with India outside the constraints of a purely South-East
Asian frame of  reference? In other  words,  is  China prepared to  consider  its  Indian
neighbour as no longer a merely regional power, but as a major cornerstone in Asia as a
whole?
5 There are certain elements of a possible reply to this question in the slim volume edited
by Gilles Boquérat and Frédéric Grare. This is a collection of articles by five French and
Indian  specialist  contributors,  based  on  the  hypothesis  of  a  triangular  relationship
between  China,  India  and  Russia.  Their  concern  is  to  investigate  informally  the
prospects for a strategic triangle proposed by the Russian premier, Yevgeny Primakov,
in December 1998. Although such a triangle may appear premature, if it is understood
as a fully formalised strategic partnership, the relations which have developed between
the three powers lead these writers to speak of an Asian triangle, defined in their terms
as “a loose entity which, despite its own inner dynamics and contradictions, is laden
with direct consequences for the whole continent of Asia”.
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6 Gilles Boquérat’s historical approach shows that even the tentative dream of trilateral
Sino-Russian-Indian  co-operation  is  an  event  in  itself,  for  recent  history  contains
hardly  any  precedents  for  such  a  three-sided  diplomatic  arrangement.  However
innovative it may be, contemporary tendencies towards this idea of an Asian triangle
are nonetheless not without tensions. One of its main structural problems is China’s
disinclination to recognise India as playing a pivotal role in Asia. China’s mixed feelings
are clearly brought out in the chapter by Jean-Pierre Cabestan. He shows that, even
while she extols a multipolar ideal, China is above all concerned with establishing itself
as the alter ego of the United States in the Asian theatre, and this means ensuring that
no  other  power,  such  as  India  or  Japan,  be  allowed  to  cast  a  shadow  over  such
ambitions. For his part, Frédéric Grare notes that the strategic partnerships between
the three corners of the triangle have remained bilateral in nature. And whereas the
Indo-Russian  and  the  Sino-Russian  links  are  relatively  firm,  Sino-Indian  relations,
notwithstanding their increased warmth, are still undoubtedly the weakest link.
7 There  is  another  critical  parameter,  namely  the  dominant  influence  of  the  United
States. Even though the idea of an Asian triangle has arisen out of a shared disquiet in
the face of the American superpower, that country remains the privileged partner of
each of the three others, and this fact undoubtedly places a limit on their prospects for
co-operation.  But,  according  to  these  authors,  a  trilateral  rapprochement  may  still
provide a tempting option, if it permits each participant to increase its power, while
helping to preserve regional security. That is why Swaram Singh’s opinion is that the
idea of an Asian triangle offers a promising strategic paradigm for Asia, and one that is
certainly more promising than the anti-missile defence plan promoted by the United
States. Finally, in an exploratory chapter, Kanti Bajpai identifies a certain number of
problem areas in which India, Russia and China could strengthen their co-operation.
These  include  Islamic  terrorism,  the  American  anti-missile  defence  plan,  and  the
energy reserves in Central Asia.
8 The clarity of this work by different authors throws into relief the motives behind the
three countries’  interest  in entertaining the idea of  a  triangular relationship,  while
nonetheless stressing the numerous practical contradictions which it would entail. One
of the immediate goals would be progress from the conceptual stage to the beginnings
of  a  working  partnership,  however  limited.  The  overall  survey  undertaken  by  this
volume could perhaps have been more complete with the participation of a Russian
expert.  And,  looking further  ahead,  it  would be  particularly  interesting to  have an
American view of  the prospect  of  a  formal  entente between the three major  Asian
powers.
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